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FORFEITURE REMISSION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF BRITISH, CANADIAN, AND
UNITED STATES POLICY
Prestina Edna Starks and Felix Mike lived together from Au-
gust, 1974, to February, 1975. On the evening of December 11,
1974, Mr. Mike received a telephone call from a friend requesting a
ride to the Los Angeles International Airport. Mr. Mike consented
to the request, and Ms. Starks permitted him to use her car. She
used his larger car to pick up friends so that they could meet Mr.
Mike at a restaurant.
Mr. Mike's passenger asked to stop at the Marriott Hotel near
the airport. At the hotel the passenger sold herion to an undercover
agent which resulted in the arrest of both the passenger and Mr.
Mike. Ms. Starks' car, a 1974 Mercury Cougar, was seized at the
time of arrest.'
During the forefeiture trial' that followed, the court found that
Ms. Starks "was not involved in or aware of the wrongful activ-#", "93 p - I
Y. Even1 though they had lived together for several months, there
was no evidence that Ms. Starks knew that Mr. Mike would be in-
volved in narcotics trafficking; furthermore, no evidence was pro-
duced to show that Mr. Mike knew the trip to the airport would
involve him in a narcotics sale.a
Neither Ms. Starks nor Mr. Mike was a party to the forfeiture
trial. Rather, the proceeding was against the 1974 Mercury Cougar
XR 7, pursuant to the United States Code.5 That code provides for
the forfeiture of any property used, or intended for use, to transport
or facilitate the transport of a controlled substance.6
1. United States v. One 1974 Mercury Cougar XR 7, 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C.D. Cal.
1975).
2. Id. The purpose of the trial was to prove that the automobile was used to transport
heroin, a controlled substance, in violation of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881
(1976). See note 6 infra for the pertinent provisions of the statute.
3. 397 F. Supp. 1325, 1327.
4. Id. at 1325.
5. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1976).
6. Id. Section 881 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no prop-
erty right shall exist in them:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used,
or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transporta-
tion, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph
(I) or (2), except that-
(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the trans-
action of business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under the provisions of
1
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Prior to trial, Ms. Starks' petition to the appropriate agency for
the return of her car had been denied.' However, the trial court,
departing from established authority, reversed the administrative
decision and effectuated the return of the vehicle.'
A system that allows the forfeiture of a vehicle belonging to an
innocent9 party deserves close scrutiny. The forfeiture"° and remis-
sion" provisions of the United States, Great Britain, and Canada
will be examined in order to compare the various statutory
approaches to forfeiture remission. This comparative study is
designed to expose infirmities inherent in United States forfeiture
remission laws. Proposals will be recommended to resolve these in-
equities. These proposals will be based upon an examination of
United States, British, and Canadian statutory guidelines, as well as
applicable case law.
I. THE CONCEPT OF FORFEITURE
The term "forfeiture" refers to a government's power to force
the surrender of property used in contravention of its laws.' 2 The
concept of forfeiture has its origin in the ordinances of Mosiac
law.'3 The inanimate object, by way of legal fiction, was deemed
guilty of the wrongdoing.' 4 Common law adopted this fiction in the
this section unless it shall appear that the owner or other person in charge of such
conveyance was a consenting party or privy to a violation of this subchapter or
subchapter II of this chapter, and
(B) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section
by reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been
committed or omitted by any person other than such owner while such conveyance
was unlawfully in the possession of a person other than the owner in violation of
the criminal laws of the United States, or of any state.
7. 397 F. Supp. 1325. Ms. Starks exhausted all available administrative remedies by
petitioning the Drug Enforcement Agency for the return of her automobile. She appealed the
denial of remission to the United States Attorney General. The appeal was also denied.
8. Id. Courts have no authority to remit property forfeited pursuant to the Controlled
Substances Act. See notes 106 and 113 infra, and accompanying text.
9. For present purposes an innocent party may include, but is not limited to, lien-
holders or owners with an interest in the forfeited property who are free from complicity in
the offense and without knowledge of the wrongdoer's propensity for participation in illegal
activity.
10. See note 12 infira, and accompanying text.
11. Remission is the return of forfeited property to the owner of record.
12. See generally Finkelstein, The Goring Ox, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169 (1973); Comment,
Due Process in Automobile Forfeiture Proceedings, 3 UNIV. OF BALT. L. REV. 270 (1974).
13. Exodus 21:28. "When an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall be
stoned, and its flesh not be eaten. .... "
14. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-20 (1971).
2
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form of deodands.' 5 An action in rem against the "thing" has pre-
served this legal fiction.
16
At common law the prevailing philosophy was that the severity
of the law of deodands should be counter-balanced by giving due
regard to "'the moral innocence of the party incurring the pen-
alty.' "'7 However, United States law,' 8 with one exception,' 9 has
disregarded the issue of the moral innocence of the owner or
lienholder of transportation property.2"
Once the government determines that property has been used
for illegal purposes, it is "seized as forfeited";2' the owner ceases to
have a right to possess property so used.22 Proceedings are required
to finalize the forfeiture. These proceedings are referred to as con-
demnation or forfeiture proceedings.
The return of forfeited property to the owner of record is
called remission. If the property is not remitted, the claimant may
15. Calern-Toledo v- Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), states: "Deo-
dand derives from the Latin Deo dandum, 'to be given to God'."
16. See, e.g., United States v. One 1962 Ford Thunderbird, 232 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. I11.
1964).
17. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 695 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Juries at common law considered the issue of the owner's innocence in deciding
whether his property should be forfeited. This consideration lessened the severity of forfei-
ture.
18. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-271,
§ 301(hh), 84 Stat. 291. Section 1618 provides:
Whenever any person interested in any vehicle, merchandise, or baggage seized
under the provisions of this chapter, or who has incurred, or is alleged to have
incurred any fine or penalty thereunder, files with the Secretary of the Treasury
under the customs laws or under the navigation laws, before the sale of such vessel,
vehicle, merchandise, or baggage a petition for the remission or mitigation of such
fine, penalty, or forfeiture, the Secretary of the Treasury, if he finds that such fine,
penalty, or forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without any inten-
tion on the part of the petitioner to defraud the revenue or to violate the law, or
finds the existence of such mitigating circumstances as to justify the remission or
mitigation of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture, may remit or mitigate the same upon
such terms and conditions as he deems reasonable and just, or order discontinuance
of any prosecution relating thereto. In order to enable him to ascertain the facts, the
Secretary of the Treasury may issue a commission to any customs officer to take
testimony upon such petition: Proided, That nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to deprive any person of an award of compensation made before the filing of
such petition.
The authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to remit or mitigate under this section has
been delegated to the Attorney General. See 28 C.F.R. § 9.1 (1977).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3617 (1976). See note 28 infra.
20. See generally United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 108 F. Supp. 286
(W.D. Pa. 1952); United States v. One 1958 Pontiac Coupe, 298 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1958);
United States v. One 1967 Cadillac Coupe Eldorado, 415 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1969). See also
note 106 infra, and accompanying text.
21. See generally cases cited in note 20 supra. Property is deemed to have been for-
feited from the time of its proscribed use.
22. See note 87 infra, and accompanying text.
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be compensated for all or part of its value. This is known as mitiga-
tion, although remission and mitigation are generally treated as one
concept.23
II. PROVISIONS FOR FORFEITURE AND REMISSION
The forfeiture laws enacted by Britain, Canada, and the
United States all have similar provisions. Each country has a stat-
ute that provides for the forfeiture of transportation property used
in violation of customs laws. However, the laws of each country
providing for remission of forfeitures vary significantly.
The British leave the question of remission to the sole discre-
tion of the Commissioners of Customs and Excise. Judicial review
of the Commissioner's decision is not allowed. The United States
approach to remission of forfeitures, except those involving viola-
tions of liquor related internal revenue laws, is similar to the British
system. In the United States, statutory provisions for remission of
forfeitures arising out of liquor law violations provide for the exer-
cise of judicial discretion. This procedure substantially conforms to
the Canadian approach to forfeitures of property belonging to in-
nocent parties.
The divergent treatment of forfeitures in the United States,
Britain, and Canada warrants a brief examination of the laws of
each country. This examination will be followed by a comparative
study of the merits of each system.
A. United States
An innocent person's property may be forfeited for violations
of customs laws,24 the transportation of controlled substances,25
transportation in violation of provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954,26 and the transportation of certain articles of contra-
23. For the purpose of this comment, reference to remission is understood to include
mitigation.
24. Tariff Act of 1930, § 595a, 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (1976), provides in part:
(a) Except as specified in the proviso to section 1594 of this title, every vessel,
vehicle, animal, aircraft, or other thing used in, to aid in, or to facilitate, by ob-
taining information or in any other way, the importation, bringing in, unlading,
landing, removal, concealing, harboring, or subsequent transportation of any article
which is being or has been introduced, or attempted to be introduced, into the
United States contrary to law, whether upon such vessel, vehicle, animal, aircraft,
or other thing or otherwise, shall be seized and forfeited together with its tackel,
apparel, furniture, harness, or equipment.
25. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1976). See note 6 supra.
26. Int. Rev. Code of 1954,26 U.S.C. § 7301(e) (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 85-
4
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band.2 7 With one exception, 28 each of these statutes incorporates by
859, § 204(8), 72 Stat. 1429; and I.R.C. § 7302. After describing taxable property and the
fraudulent avoidance of payment thereof, section 7301(e) provides:
Any property (including aircraft, vehicles, vessels, or draft animals) used to
transport or for the deposit or concealment of property described in subsection (a)
or (b), or any property used to transport or for the deposit or concealment of prop-
erty describedin subsection (a), may also be seized, and shall be forfeited to the
United States.
Section 7302 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful to have or possess any property intended for use in violating the
provisions of the internal revenue laws, or regulations prescribed under such laws,
or which has been so used, and no property rights shall exist in any such property
.... The seizure and forfeiture of any property under the provisions of this sec-
tion and the disposition of such property subsequent to seizure and forfeiture, or
the disposition of the proceeds from the sale of such property, shall be in accord-
ance with existing laws or those hereafter in existance relating to seizures, forfeit-
ures, and disposition of property or proceeds, for violation of the internal revenue
laws.
27. 49 U.S.C. §§ 781, 782 (1970). Section 781 provides in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful (1) to transport, carry, or convey any contraband arti-
cle in, upon, or by means of any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft; (2) to conceal or possess
any contraband article in or upon any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft, or upon the person
of anyone in or upon any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft; or (3) to use any vessel, vehicle,
or aircraft to facilitate the transportation, carriage, conveyance, concealment, re-
ceipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter, exchange, or giving away of any contra-
band article.
Part (b) of section 781 defines "contraband article." Included in that definition are narcotic
drugs, certain firearms, and certain "coin or obligation or other security of the United States
or of any foreign government." Section 782 provides in part:
Any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft which has been or is being used in violation of
any provision of section 781 of this title, or in, upon, or by means of which any
violation of said section has taken or is taking place, shall be seized and forfeited
Similar provisions relating to common carriers and stolen transportation property set forth in
note 6 supra are included in this section.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3617 (1976). The remission of forfeited transportation property seized
pursuant to internal revenue liquor laws is decided by the court. Section 3617 provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Jurisdiction of court.
Whenever, in any proceeding in court for the forfeiture, under the internal-
revenue laws, of any vehicle or aircraft seized for a violation of the internal-revenue
laws relating to liquors, such forfeiture is decreed, the court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to remit or mitigate the forfeiture.
(b) Conditions precedent to remission or mitigation.
In any such proceeding the court shall not allow the claim of any claimant for
remission or mitigation unless and until he proves (1) that he has an interest in such
vehicle or aircraft, as owner or otherwise, which he acquired in good faith, (2) that
he had at no time any knowledge or reason to believe that it was bein& or would be
used in the violation of laws of the United States or of any State relating to liquor,
and (3) if it appears that the interest asserted by the claimant arises out of or is in
any way subject to any contract or agreement under which any person having a
record or reputation for violating laws of the United States or of any State relating
to liquor has a right with respect to such vehicle or aircraft, that, before such claim-
ant acquired his interest, or such other person acquired his right under such con-
tract or asreement, whichever occurred [ater, the claimant, his officer or agent, was
informed in answer to his inquiry, at the headquarters of the sheriff, chief of police,
picipal Federal internal-revenue officer engaged in the enforcement of the liquor
lws, or other principal local or Federal law-enforcement officer of the locality in
which such other person acquired his right under such contract or areement, of the
locality in which such other person then resided and of each locality in which the
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reference the remission provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930.29
Under this Act, the sole issue before the trial court in a forfeiture
proceeding is whether the transportation property was used for the
proscribed purposes. 30 The innocence or good faith of the owner or
lienholder is irrelevant.3'
1. Provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930. Property seized by
United States customs officers will be appraised to determine its
fair market value.32 For transporation property with a fair market
value of $2,500 or less, customs officers will publish, for three con-
secutive weeks, a notice of seizure and intention to forfeit.33 If a
claim for remission is filed, the claimant is required to post a
bond.34 The United States Attorney will then institute a forfeiture
proceeding against the seized property.35 If no claim is made, the
transportation property is summarily condemned by an administra-
tor as forfeited.36 Once forfeited, the vehicle may be put into gov-
ernment service or sold. 37 Property valued at more than $2,500 is
referred to the United States Attorney for forfeiture proceedings
even if no claim is made.38
Prior to a forfeiture action, a party seeking remission of for-
feited property may petition the agency which seized the property.
An agency decision not to remit is appealable to the Attorney Gen-
eral.39 The Attorney General "may remit or mitigate with such
claimant has made any other inquiry as to the character or financial standing of
such other person, that such other person had no such record or reputation.
29. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1976); I.R.C. § 7327; 49 U.S.C.
§ 784 (1970). 49 U.S.C. § 784 is typical of the sections which refer to customs law for remis-
sion and mitigation purposes:
All provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture,
and condemnation of vessels and vehicles for violation of the customs laws; the
disposition of such vessels and vehicles or the proceeds from the sale thereof; the
remission or mitigation of such forfeitures; and the compromise of claims and the
award of compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to
seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provi-
sions of this chapter, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions
hereof ....
30. See United States v. One 1961 Cadillac Hardtop Automobile, 207 F. Supp. 693
(E.D. Tenn. 1962).
31. Id See also cases cited at note 20 supra.
32. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976).
33. Id. § 1607.
34. Id. § 1608. Contra, Lee v. Thornton, 538 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976). The court struck
down the bond requirement of 250 dollars where the claimant was unable to pay it.
35. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976).
36. Id. § 1609.
37. Id. §§ 1609 & 1612. See also Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1976).
38. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976).
39. Id. § 1618. See also 28 C.F.R. § 9.3 (1977).
6
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terms and conditions as he deems fair and just" if: the claimant was
not willfully negligent; the claimant had no intention to defraud the
revenue or violate the law; or, there were mitigating circum-
stances. 40 Further, the petitioner must establish "a valid, good faith
interest in the seized property as owner or otherwise."'" The peti-
tioner must also show that he had no knowledge or reason to be-
lieve that the wrongdoer had a record or reputation for violating
United States laws or state laws for related crimes.42
2. Due Process. Forfeiture laws, and the failure of the gov-
ernment to remit forfeited property belonging to innocent owners,
have frequently been attacked on due process grounds. 43 The prin-
ciple set forth in Van Oster v. Kansas" assists in understanding the
court's reluctance to uphold due process challenges to forfeiture
laws:
[Clertain uses of property may be regarded as so undesireable
that the owner surrenders his control at his peril. The law thus
builds a secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes
evasions by dispensing with the necessity ofjudicial inquiry as to
collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent own-
er. So here the legislature, to effect a purpose clearly within its
power, has adopted a device consonant with recognized princi-
ples and therefore within the limits of due process.
45
The courts continue to ignore due process challenges to forfeit-
ures. In the case of United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile Automo-
bile,46 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court
decision which ordered the remission of the seized vehicle to the
claimant, General Motors Acceptance Corporation. The Fifth Cir-
cuit found that the lower court had exceeded its authority.47 The
lower court reasoned that because only a "very small quantity"
48 of
40. Specific guidelines for the remission of forfeitures under 19 U.S.C. § 1618 are set
forth in 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.3 & 9.5 (1977).
41. 28 C.F.R. § 9.5(c) (1977).
42. Id.
43. See generally Lee v. Thornton, 538 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. One
1974 Mercury Cougar XR 7, 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C.D. Cal. 1975); United States v. One 1967
Ford Mustang, 457 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1972).
44. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
45. Id. at 467-68.
46. 256 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1958).
47. The only issue properly before the court was whether the proscribed activity, which
led to the forfeiture of the vehicle, had occurred. See also United States v. One 1967 Cadillac
Coupe Eldorado, 415 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1969). On appeal, only the issue of due process was
reviewed by the court.
48. Thirteen grams. 256 F.2d 931, 932.
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marijuana was found in the possession of a passenger, and there
was no evidence that the driver knew he was transporting mari-
juana, it would be "unconscionable" to allow forfeiture of the car.
49
The Fifth Circuit found that neither the small quantity of mari-
juana, nor the innocence or good faith of the owner, was a basis for
remission.5" The court stated, as a matter of settled law, that a for-
feiture under the forfeiture statute 5 1 was not an unconstitutional
taking without just compensation.52
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.," the United
States Supreme Court ruled that "seizure for purposes of forfeiture
is one of those 'extraordinary situations that justify postponing no-
tice and opportunity for a hearing.' ",54 The Court noted that post-
ponement of notice and opportunity to be heard will withstand
constitutional scrutiny if: 1) the existance of significant governmen-
tal interests permits assertion of in rem jurisdiction over property;
2) a preseizure hearing might frustrate the purpose of the statute
since the property might be removed, destroyed, or concealed; and
3) seizure is determined and initiated by the government.
55
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected another due proc-
ess attack on forfeiture statutes56 in United States v. One 1967 Ford
Mustang.57 In that case, appellant argued that the statutes in ques-
tion were penal in nature; therefore, they were unconstitutionally
vague insofar as they were applied to penalize an innocent
lienholder.58 The court reasoned that since the proceeding was not
penal in nature, forfeiture was a valid exercise of federal police
power rather than a taking.59 The district court for the northern
district of Illinois, in United States v. One 1962 Ford Thunderbird,6 °
reached the same conclusion. The court noted that, "we cannot,
under the guise of vagueness, nullify a statute which enacts a policy
with which we may not agree. ' 61 The court likened the loss a
49. Id. at 932.
50. Id. at 933.
51. 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970). See note 27 supra. Exceptions for common carriers and
stolen vehicles are also provided in this section. See, e.g., note 6 supra.
52. 256 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1958).
53. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
54. Id. at 677, quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972).
55. 416 U.S. 663, 679.
56. 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970). See note 28 supra.
57. 457 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1972).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 232 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
61. Id. at 1021.
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lienholder suffers upon forfeiture of transportation property to the
loss a creditor suffers upon the execution of a criminal. Neither
constitutes an unconstitutional taking.
62
Notwithstanding the impressive authority upholding forfeit-
ures on due process grounds, several courts have attempted to strike
down the laws as they are applied to innocent owners of transporta-
tion property.63 While other courts have upheld forfeitures, they
have been critical of the laws as they are applied.' 4 Lower court
mistrust of the forfeiture doctrine is easily understood in light of the
United States Supreme Court comment in United States v. United
States Coin & Currency:
65
Even Blackstone, who is not known as a biting critic of the
English legal tradition, condemned the seizure of the property of
the innocent as based upon a 'superstition' inherited from the
'blind days' of feudalism . . . . And this court in the past has
recognized the difficulty of reconciling the broad scope of tradi-
tional forfeiture doctrine with the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment.66
Transportation property in which an innocent party has an
ownership interest continues to be forfeited. A denial of remission
of such property is unjust and unfair. Consequently, the courts may
find they are unable, in good conscience, to uphold forfeitures as to
innocent parties. The legislature is left with two alternatives: first, it
may alleviate some of the courts' concerns regarding innocent par-
ties by allowing judicial review of forfeiture remission decisions;
second, Congress may do nothing, in which case the courts may
become more inclined to strike down forfeitures as to innocent par-
62. Id. at 1022.
63. See United States v. One 1974 Mercury Cougar XR 7, 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C.D. Cal.
1975) (forfeiture of a vehicle deemed to be the property of a party innocent of any wrongdo-
ing held invalid on due process and other grounds). Cf. Lee v. Thornton, 538 F.2d 27 (2d
Cir. 1976). In Lee, forfeiture of transporation property belonging to a party guilty of statu-
tory violations was held invalid on due process grounds, specifically, lack of adequate notice
and opportunity to be heard. The court held that immediate post-seizure hearings are re-
quired "to avoid unreasonable continuation of the government custody of the vehicles." 1d.
at 31.
64. See United States v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 457 F.2d 931, 932-33 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 207 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). In both cases the
courts lamented the harshness of the forfeiture provision they felt compelled to uphold; but
see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). The general rule is
that seizure without prior notice and hearing is violative of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution. However, forfeiture is an exception to the general rule. Further-
more, Puerto Rico had no remission provisions in their forfeiture statutes.
65. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
66. Id. at 720-21.
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ties on due process grounds.67
3. Internal Revenue Liquor Laws. Remission procedures for
forfeitures resulting from violations of internal revenue liquor laws
are to be contrasted with the procedures discussed above. Exclusive
jurisdiction to remit seized property is vested in the court, rather
than in the Attorney General.68 Consequently, the court may con-
sider the issue of the claimant's innocence in addition to the foun-
dational issue of whether the property was used in violation of the
law.
Several factors must exist before the court will order remission
of forfeited property: first, the claimant's interest in the property
must have been acquired in good faith; second, the claimant must
have had no knowledge or reason to have known that the transpor-
tation property would be used in violation of the internal revenue
liquor laws; and third, if the claimant's interest arises out of a con-
tract or agreement, he must show that he made an adequate inquiry
into the record or reputation of the wrongdoer as to prior violations
of these laws.69
B. Great Britain
The Customs and Excise Act of 195270 is the most recent piece
of British legislation involving customs forfeitures and procedures
for remission. This Act repealed and re-enacted the Customs Laws
Consolidation of 1876.7t
The principle section of the 1952 Act dealing with the forfei-
ture of transportation property provides that any ship, aircraft, ve-
hicle, or animal will be subject to forfeiture if it has been "used for
the carriage, handling, deposit or concealment of the thing so liable
to forfeiture. 72 A vehicle may be forfeited under this section for
the mere incidental carriage of a prohibited item.73 A separate sec-
tion provides for the forfeiture of any transportation property con-
67. See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Mercury Cougar XR 7, 397 F. Supp. 1325
(C.D. Cal. 1975).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3617(a) (1976). See note 28 supra.
69. Id. § 3617(b). See note 28 supra.
70. Customs and Excise Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c.44, sched. (1952). There
have been various amendments to the 1952 Act and related legislation but none are within
the scope of this comment.
71. Customs Laws Consolidation, 39 & 40 Vict., c.36, §§ 169 et seq. (1876).
72. Customs and Excise Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & I Eliz. 2, c.44, § 277 (1952).
73. Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Bradley, [1959] 1 Q.B. 219. The owner of
forfeited trucks avoided paying the proper duty on oil he subsequently used for consumption
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structed for the purpose of concealment.74
The procedural guidelines for forfeiture and forfeiture remis-
sion are embodied in Schedule Seven of the 1952 Act.7 5 The Com-
missioners of Customs and Excise are granted complete discretion
to do "as they see fit" with any "thing" seized or forfeited as a re-
by the offending vehicles. The forfeiture of the vehicles was upheld as prohibited carriage in
violation of customs laws even though the oil was not transported as cargo.
74. Customs and Excise Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c.44, § 75 (1952). There
are also special provisions for ships exceeding 250 tons register. Id. §§ 278 & 279. Section
278 provides in part:
(1) [A] ship of two hundred and fifty or more tons register shall not be liable to
forfeiture under or by virtue of any provision of this Act, except under section sev-
enty-five thereof, unless the offense in respect of or in connection with which the
forfeiture is claimed-
(a) was substantially the object of the voyage during which the offence was
committed; or
(b) was committed while the ship was under chase by a vessel in the service
of Her Majesty after failing to bring to when properly summoned to do so by that
vessel.
kl The exemption from forfeiture of any ship under this section shall not affect
any liability to forfeiture of goods carried therein.
75. Id. sched. 7, which provides in part:
1. The Commissioners shall give notice of the seizure of any thing as liable to
forfeiture and of the grounds therefor to any person who to their knowledge was at
the time of the seizure the owner or one of the owners thereof:
[Niotice shall not be required. . . if the seizure was made in the presence of-
(a) the person whose offence or suspected offence occasioned the seizure; or
(b) the owner or any of the owners of the thing seized or any servant or agent
of his; or
(c) the master or commander.
2. Notice. . .shall be given in writing ....
3. Any person claiming that any thing seized as liable to forfeiture is not so liable
shall, within one month of the date of the notice of seizure or, where no such notice
has been served on him, within one month of the date of the seizure, give notice of
his claim in writing to the Commissioners ....
5. If. . . no such notice has been given. the thing in question shall be deemed
to have been duly condemned as forfeited.
6. Where notice. . is duly given. . . the Commissioners shall take proceedings
for the condemnation of that thing by the court, and if the court finds that the thing
was at the time of seizure liable to forfeiture the court shall condemn it as forfeited.
7. Where any thing is ...condemned or deemed to have been condemned as
forfeited . . . the forfeiture shall have effect as from the date when the liability to
forfeiture arose.
8. Proceedings for condemnation shall be civil proceedings ....
10. (1) [T]he thing seized was. . . the property of the claimant at the time of the
seizure.
(2) [T]he claimant shall give such security for the costs of the proceedings
(3) If any requirement of this paragraph is not complied with, the court shall
ve judgment for the Commissioners.
[E]ither party may appeal against the decision of that court to a court of quarter
sessions.
Paragraph 15 concerns "[p]roperty of a body corporate, of two or more partners or of any
number of persons exceeding five. ... Paragraph 16 provides in part:
Commissioners may at any time if they see fit. . . deliver it up to any claimant...
or if the thing is a living creature . . . sell or destroy it.
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suit of violations of the Customs and Excise Act.76 Once the Com-
missioners decline to remit property for which a claim has been
made, the court must condemn that property." The only issue
before the court is whether the "thing" seized was liable to forfei-
ture at the time of seizure.78 The courts may not consider mitigating
circumstances79 and have no discretion to remove transportation
property from that class of "things" forfeited once it is determined
that the property was properly subject to forfeiture.8 0 Therefore,
once the Commissioner has denied remission and the property has
been condemned by the court, the claimant has no remaining rem-
edy.
C. Canada
The Canadian Customs Act of 195281 was revised and re-en-
acted in 1970.82 With a few minor exceptions83 the revised Act is
substantially similar to the 1952 Act.
The Customs Act of 1970 contains sections which provide for
the forfeiture of a vessel or vehicle used in violation of the Act.84
76. Id. § 288. The relevant provisions are:
The Commissioners may, as they see fit-
(a) stay, sist or compound any proceedings for an offence or for the condem-
nation of any thing as being forfeited under the customs or excise Acts; or
(b) restore, subject to such conditions, if any, as they think proper, any thing
forfeited or seized under the said Acts; or
(c) after judgment, mitigate or remit any pecuniary penalty imposed under
the said Acts.
77. Id. sched. 7, para. 6. See note 75 supra.
78. Customs and Excise Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & I Eliz. 2, c.44, sched. 7, para. 7
(1952). See note 76 supra.
79. Customs and Excise Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & I Eliz. 2, c.44, sched. 7, para. 6
(1952). See note 75 supra.
80. See DeKeyser v. British Ry. Traffic and Electric Co., Ltd., [1936] I K.B. 224.
81. Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.58 (1952).
82. Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.C-40 (1970).
83. Recent changes in the Customs Act involve, for the most part, an extention of Ca-
nada's territorial waters. These changes are not within the scope of this comment.
84. Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.C-40, §§ 182(i), 183(1) & 231(1) (1970). Section
182(1) provides:
If any goods are unlawfully imported on any railway, they shall be seized and
forfeited, and the car in which the goods were so imported shall be seized and
detached from the train and forfeited.
Section 183(l) provides:
All vessels, with the guns, tackle, apparel and furniture thereof, and all vehi-
cles, harness, tackle, horses and cattle made use of in the importation or unshipping
or landing or removal or subsequent transportation of any goods liable to forfeiture
under this Act, shall be seized and forfeited.
Section 231(1) provides:
All goods shipped or unshipped, imported or exported, carried or conveyed,
contrary to this Act or to any regulation, and all goods or vehicles, and all vessels,
12
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Under these sections, property seized as forfeited 85 is condemned
by the Deputy Minister of Revenue. However, a claimant may file
an action to avoid automatic condemnation by submitting a written
request within one month from the day of seizure.86 Automatic
condemnation is supported by the court's reasoning that "forfeiture
results ipsofacto from the commission of the offense and no act of
any customs officials. . . can undo that forfeiture."87
Although Canadian forfeiture laws appear superficially to be
harsh, the procedure serves to protect the rights of the innocent
claimant by providing access to the courts at critical stages in which
injustice is most likely to occur. For example, the Deputy Minister
of Revenue is required to give written notice to any owner or other
claimant that a seizure has occurred.88 Once notice is given, the
claimant must submit, within thirty days of the date of seizure, evi-
dence in support of his claim for remission.89 If a claim is made,
accompanied by supporting evidence, the Deputy Minister may, in
his discretion, forfeit or remit the seized property; alternatively, the
Deputy Minister may assess a monetary penalty against the claim-
ant. The Deputy Minister may also elect to submit the matter for
judicial determination.90 If the latter course is not followed, the
Deputy Minister's decision is final unless the claimant gives written
notice of non-acceptance within thirty days of the decision.9 Once
a notice of non-acceptance is filed, the Deputy Minister may either
reconsider his decision or submit the issue for judicial determina-
tion.92 If the issue is submitted to the court, the court is empowered
to "decide according to the right of the matter."93
This procedure, which vests in the Deputy Minister the discre-
tion to forward the matter for judicial determination, is counterbal-
with regard to which the requirements of this Act or any regulation have not been
complied with, or with respect to which any attempt has been made to violate the
provisions of this Act or any regulation, are liable to forfeiture.
85. Since a vehicle is considered forfeited at the moment the wrong is done it is seized
as forfeited. See note 21 supra, and accompanying text.
86. Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.C-40, § 153 (1970), which provides in part:
All vessels, vehicles, goods or other things seized as forfeited shall be deemed
and taken to be condemned without suit. . . unless. . . some person. . . within
one month from the day of seizure, payment or deposit, gives notice in writing to
the seizing officer at the nearest port that he claims or intends to claim the same.
87. Re Bank of Montreal and Dombowsky, [1972] 24 D.L.R. 3d 297, 302 (1969).
88. Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.C-40, § 161 (1970).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 163(1).
91. Id. § 164.
92. Id. § 165.
93. Id. § 166.
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anced by a procedure which provides the claimant direct access to
the courts. Following the direct access procedure, the "owner, mort-
gagee, lienholder, or holder of any like interest" may submit,
within sixty days of the date of seizure, a written application to the
court "for an order declaring his interest."94 The courts strictly ad-
here to this time requirement.95
If the claimant applies for direct access to the courts, the court
will issue an order that the claimant's interest is not affected by the
seizure96 if: the claimant is innocent of complicity in the offense or
of collusion with the offender; and, the claimant has "exercised all
reasonable care in respect of the person" he allowed to be in posses-
sion of the vehicle or vessel at the time it was seized. The claimant
must have made reasonable inquiry that the property was not likely
to be used for purposes contrary to the Act.97 Either party may ap-
peal the decision of the court.98
III. A COMPARISON OF FORFEITURE REMISSION PROCEDURES
Britain, Canada, and the United States have each adopted di-
vergent approaches to the remission of forfeited property. Britain
favors unreviewable administrative discretion. Canada tempers ad-
ministrative discretion with judicial review. The United States has
adopted both approaches.99 What follows is a comparative study of
these procedures. This analysis will expose the inequities of forfei-
ture remission procedures set forth in the United States Tariff Act
of 1930.
94. Id. § 168(2).
95. Croteau v. Robidoux, [1958] Que. C.B.R. 338. The plaintiff, though denied remis-
sion because he filed his claim late, was permitted to sue the wrongdoer for damages arising
out of the forfeiture of plaintiffs vehicle.
96. Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.C-40, § 168(5) (1970).
97. Id. § 168(5) which provides:
Where, upon the hearing of an application, it is made to appear to the satisfac-
tion of the judge
(a) that the claimant is innocent of any complicity in the offence resulting in
such seizure or of any collusion with the offender in relation thereto. ...
(b) that the claimant exercised all reasonable care in respect of the person
permitted to obtain the possession of such vessel, vehicle, goods or thing to satisfy
himself that it was not likely to be used contrary to this Act or, if a mortgagee or
lien-holder, he exercised such care with respect to the mortgagor or lien-giver, the
claimant is entitled to an order that his interest is not affected by such seizure.
98. Id. § 168(6). Property may also be recovered subsequent to condemnation proceed-
ings by filings pursuant to § 263(1). As provided by § 265, there is a three-year statute of
limitations on both the recovery of forfeited property and the enforcement of penalties under
the Act.
99. See notes 6, 24, 26 & 27 supra; contra, see note 28 supra.
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A. Administrative Review
Remission laws which provide for unreviewable administra-
tive discretion assume the laws will be administered with fairness
and justice. I°° This assumption prevails in Britain. 0 ' United States
courts, on the other hand, have fostered a sense of unbridled power
in the executive to remit forfeited property. This subtle distinction
is elucidated in pronouncements by the courts of the two countries.
In DeKeyser v. British Railway Traffic and Electric Co., Ltd,
the Kings Bench stated that "[o]ne must assume that the commis-
sioners will act reasonably and without undue hardship if an appli-
cation is made to them to remit the forfeiture which the law has
imposed on some vehicle."'0 2 Twenty-eight years later the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals restated the well-settled United States
view:
The purpose of the remission statutes was to grant the executive
power to relieve against the harshness of forfeitures. The exercise
of the power, however, was committed to the discretion of the
executive so that he could temper justice with mercy or leniency.
Remitting the forfeiture, however, constituted an act of grace. 1
0 3
The impact of this judicial attitude is manifested in the United
States by a plethora of cases in which innocent parties have been
unable to secure remission of forfeitures. Conversely, in Britain
there have been relatively few cases contesting an administrative
decision concerning remissions.1°4
The exercise of administrative discretion embodied in the
Tariff Act of 1930105 has resulted in the denial of remission, as well
as judicial review, of forfeited property. "o It is well-settled that in-
100. The assumption is that the guidelines will be followed and applied equitably. This
assumption is implicit in the grant of the power to remit.
101. The inference drawn from the fact that so few British cases have challenged remis-
sion decisions is that the Commissioners adhere to the guidelines and make, therefore, equi-
table decisions.
102. [1936] 1 K.B. 224, 232.
103. United States v. One 1961 Cadillac Hardtop Automobile, 337 F.2d 730, 733 (6th
Cir. 1964) (emphasis added).
104. Cases challenging British administrative decisions have challenged classifications
and definitions rather than the decision itself. See generally DeKeyser v. British Ry. Traffic
and Electric Co., Ltd., [1936] 1 K.B. 224.
105. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976).
106. See generally Simons v. United States, 497 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1974); United States
v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972); United
States v. One 1958 Pontiac Coupe, 298 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1958); United States v. Andrade,
181 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1950); United States ex rel. Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Mellon, 40 F.2d
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nocence is no bar to forfeiture. 0 7
The Attorney General is not without guidance in his determi-
nation of remission cases. Indeed, both the statute0 8 and the Code
of Federal Regulations'0 9 provide guidelines to aid him in his de-
termination. The question, then, is whether the Attorney General
has followed these guidelines. It appears that he has not."'0 A Ninth
Circuit district court, in United States v. One 1974 Mercury Cougar
XR 7, denounced the Attorney General's failure to remit as "a
clear abuse of discretion."' I IThis pronouncement marks a depar-
ture from well-settled authority."I2 A contra view was expressed in
United States v. One 1961 Cadillac Hardtop Automobile, in which
the court followed established authority by declaring that, notwith-
standing the abuse of executive discretion, the judiciary had no ju-
risdiction to intervene.' 1 3  The court reasoned that the
Administrative Procedures Act" 4 expressly exempted from judicial
review matters committed to the discretion of an administrative
agency.
The court in One 1974 Mercury Cougar XR 7 distinguished
One 1961 Cadillac as having been decided prior to the United
States Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe.1' 5 The Overton Park decision led the district court in One
808 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 766 (1930); United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe
DeVille, 108 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
107. See generally note 20 supra.
108. Tariff Act of 1930, § 618, 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976).
109. 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.3 & 9.5 (1977).
110. This conclusion is inferred from the plethora of actions challenging administrative
decisions denying remission and the expressed sentiment of many courts that abuse of discre-
tion frequently occurs. Compare One 1974 Mercury Cougar, infra note 111, with One 1961
Cadillac Hardtop, infra note 113.
111. 397 F. Supp. 1325, 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
112. See notes 20 and 106 supra.
113. 337 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1964).
114. See note 117 infra.
115. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Petitioners challenged the Secretary of Transportation's deci-
sion to commit federal funds to finance the construction of highways through public parks
pursuant to authority granted by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138
(1976). Upon court challenge, the Secretary defended on the ground that his decision was not
subject to judicial review. This contention was rejected by the Court:
Section 701 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, provides that the
action of "each authority of the Government of the United States,' which includes
the Department of Transportation, is subject to judicial review except where there
is a statutory prohibition on review or where "agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law." In this case, there is no indication that Congress sought to pro-
hibit judicial review and there is most certainly no "showing of 'clear and convinc-
ing' evidence of a. . . legislative intent" to restrict access to judicial review.
Similarly, the Secretary's decision here does not fall within the exception for
action "committed to agency discretion." This is a very narrow exception . ...
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1974 Mercury Cougar XR 7 to hold that the customs remission stat-
ute"' was neither committed by law to administrative discretion
nor expressly withheld from judicial review; therefore, the court
could review claims for remission denied by the Attorney Gen-
eral. I 7 The reasoning of Overton Park, as applied to the remission
statute in One 1974 Mercury Cougar XR 7, is still subject to appeal.
In United States v. One 1969 Plymouth Fury Automobile," 8 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court decision re-
mitting property to a finance company. The specious reasoning of
the court of appeals was that "a company financing the purchase of
automobiles knows that it runs the risk of having its interest for-
feited if the car is used to transport contraband."" 9 The Fifth Cir-
cuit, en banc, denied a rehearing 20 over the dissent of six judges. '21
The dissent argued that the forfeiture statutes, viewed in conjunc-
tion with the remission statute, envision the imposition of a penalty
only for significant involvement in a criminal enterprise. 122 The dis-
sent therefore rejected the notion of forfeiture of an innocent per-
The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that it is appli-
cable in those rare instances where "statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in
a given case there is no law to apply."
401 U.S. at 410 (citations omitted).
In One 1974 CougarXR 7, 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C.D. Cal. 1975), the district court applied
this reasoning to the customs law remission statute and determined that Attorney General
decisions are subject to judicial review.
116. Tariff Act of 1930, § 618, 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976).
117. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1976). See note 14 supra. Section
701 provides in part:
(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the
extent that-
(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.
(b) For the purpose of this chapter-
(1) "agency" means such authority of the Government of the United
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency ....
Section 702 provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. do not grant
courts the substantive right of review. United States v. One 1973 Buick Riviera, 560 F.2d 897,
900 n.2 (8th Cir. 1977), citing, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); and criticizing,
United States v. One 1967 Mercury Cougar XR 7, 397 F. Supp. 1325 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
118. 476 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1973), reh. denied, 509 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 838 (1975). A denial of remission to a finance company was upheld.
119. 476 F.2d 960, 961.
120. 509 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1975).
121. Id.
122. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1971);
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974).
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son's property as a consequence of the acts of another. 123
It has been judicially recognized that the courts may exercise
jurisdiction over remission cases arising out of the Tariff Act of
1950 124 if the executive fails to exercise its authority. 25 Although
most courts have refused to review the Attorney General's decision
in remission cases, one circuit has reaffirmed the concept of judicial
review in cases where the executive fails to act. 126 Prior to judicial
intervention, however, these courts have required an allegation that
the Attorney General failed to properly exercise discretion.
27
B. Judicial Review
With one exception, 28 United States procedure in remission
cases, which is characterized by judicial non-intervention, stands in
stark contrast to the Canadian approach to forfeiture remissions.
The latter promotes active judicial participation and provides a
model worthy of emulation. In Touzin v. Minister of National Reve-
nue,' 29 the petitioner requested the Quebec Superior Court to de-
clare his interest in the forfeited vehicle unaffected by the
seizure. 13 Applying the statutory guidelines, ' 3' the court concluded
that the petitioner: 1) had satisfied the requirement of establishing
an ownership interest in the claimed vehicle, despite the violator's
substantial contribution to the purchase price; 2) was innocent of
complicity in the offense or collusion with the offender; and 3) had
satisfied the requirement of reasonable inquiry that the vehicle
would not be used contrary to the provisions of the Act.' 32 These
factual findings supported the court's decision to effectuate remis-
sion of the vehicle to the petitioner.
A Canadian court will, however, uphold a forfeiture without
remission if certain disqualifying factors exist. For example, the
court may deny an appeal for remission if the innocent party ac-
123. 509 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1975).
124. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976).
125. Cotonificio Bustese, S.A. v. Morgenthau, 121 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
126. See United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 980 (1972). See also Pullman Trust and Savings Bank v. United States, 225 F.
Supp. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
127. See generally cases cited at note 126 supra.
128. See notes 137-141 infra, and accompanying text.
129. 102 Can. Crim. Cas. 222 (Que. 1952).
130. Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.42, § 179 (1927). (Re-enacted as Customs Act,
CAN. REV. STAT. c.C-40, § 168 (1970)).
131. Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.C-40, § 168(5) (1970).
132. Touzin v. Minister of National Revenue, 102 Can. Crim. Cas. 222 (Que. 1952).
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quires his interest after the date of forfeiture, 31 since it is the ac-
complishment of the prohibited act which vests the right of
forfeiture in the government. 134 The court may also deny an appeal
if the interest of the claimant is inadequate to justify remission. 35
Further, a finding that the claimant failed to make adequate in-
quiry into the potential illegal use of the vehicle 36 may result in the
court's denial of relief. 1
37
The Commissioner knows that his decisions are subject to re-
view. Consequently, he may be more inclined to limit the exercise
of discretion by strictly adhering to the statutory guidelines. This
may account for the fact that so few Canadian cases have chal-
lenged the Commissioner's decisions.
Forfeiture remission pursuant to United States internal reve-
nue liquor laws is similar to Canadian law; both provide for judi-
cial participation in remission decisions. The power to remit lies
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts. 38 The issue of the
claimant's innocence is examined by the court in conformity with
the statute. 139 Both laws, unlike their British and United States cus-
toms law counterparts, empower the court to consider the claim-
ant's innocence as a factor in determining whether to forfeit, remit,
or mitigate.
In United States v. One 1949 Chevrolet Coach, 4 ' the United
States appealed a remission granted by the district court pursuant
to the forfeitures remission statute under the internal revenue li-
quor laws.' 4' The claimant had purchased a conditional sales con-
tract from an automobile dealer. In granting remission, the court
133. Since title to the property vests in the government at the time the wrong is commit-
ted, see note 134 infra, an attempt to acquire title to such property would be ineffective.
Thus, the claimant has no "interest" upon which he may base his claim as required by Cus-
toms Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.C-40, § 168(2). See generaly Deputy Minister of National
Revenue, Customs and Excise v. Proulx, [1970] 10 D.L.R.3d 585 (1969).
134. See Deputy Minister of National Revenue, Customs and Excise v. Proulx, [19701
10 D.L.R.3d 585 (1969); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. The Queen, [1954] 3 D.L.R.
132 (1953).
135. Babb v. The Queen, 35 Can. Crim. Cas. 365 (1965).
136. Re Fitzpatrick and Industrial Acceptance Corp., [1959] 42 Mar. Prov. 42 (Nfld.
1958); Tilden Drive Yourself Co. v. Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Customs and
Excise, [1955] Que. C.B.R. 379, 112 Can. Crim. Cas. 62.
137. Section 168(5)(b) of this Act provides that a claimant must make a reasonable in-
quiry into the possible use of the vehicle in contravention of the provisions of the Act. Cus-
toms Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.C-40, § 168(5)(b) (1970).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 3617(a) (1976).
139. Id. § 3617(b). See note 69 supra, and accompanying text.
140. 102 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Okla. 1951), afl'd, 200 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1952).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3617 (1976).
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concluded that: 1) the claimant had an ownership interest acquired
in good faith; 2) the claimant had no knowledge or reason to be-
lieve that the vehicle was being or would be used in violation of
liquor laws; and 3) the claimant's obligation of inquiry was ade-
quately discharged 142 since, unbeknown to the claimant, a "straw
purchaser" with no record was the purchasing party.
In another forfeiture action the court went further, holding
that a claimant bank was entitled to remission even though it made
no inquiry since "if inquiry had been made of the officers named in
the applicable statute, such inquiry would not have revealed infor-
mation that [the mortgagor violator] was engaged in the illegal
whiskey business." '143
IV. NEED FOR REVISION
It is clear that if United States v. One 1974 Mercury Cougar'"
had been decided in the Canadian system, or under United States
liquor laws, the owner of the vehicle would have been granted re-
mission without litigation. Indeed, but for the Attorney General's
"abuse of discretion," the car would have been remitted under the
Code of Federal Regulations guidelines.'45 Abuse or not, the vehi-
cle in question would never have been remitted to Ms. Starks if the
district court had not ignored precedent by reviewing the Attorney
General's decision on the issue of the claimant's innocence.
The United States law on remission of forfeitures is drastically
in need of revision. The courts find it more and more difficult to
justify the taking of an innocent person's transportation property
based on an anachronistic code of justice that disallows judicial dis-
cretion to decide "according to the right of the matter." '146 Six
judges of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, dissenting in the de-
nial of a rehearing on United States v. One 1969 Plymouth Fury
Automobile,'47 expressed their disdain for the concept of forfeiture
as regards innocent owners: "This rationale [that innocence and
good faith are immaterial] is barbaric, a vestigal relic of deodand. It
is anomalous to treat an innocent lien-holder as harshly as the
142. See note 69 supra, and accompanying text.
143. United States v. One 1972 Ford Pickup Truck, 374 F. Supp. 413, 415 (E.D. Tenn.
1973).
144. 220 F. Supp. 1325 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
145. 28 C.F.R. § 9.5(c) (1977).
146. Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.C-40, § 166 (1970). See note 93 supra, and accom-
panying text.
147. 509 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1975).
605
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criminal owner of the automobile." 14 8
A. Proposals
1. Administrative Procedure. Forfeiture remission proce-
dures should be made uniform in both their application and
administration. At present, several federal agencies are empowered
to seize property as forfeited.'49 Each agency is authorized to remit
seized property pursuant to provisions in the Tariff Act of 1930 110
which embodies the customs law. Each agency, however, adopts its
own guidelines to administer forfeiture remissions prior to the final
appeal to the Attorney General. It is proposed that all initial peti-
tions for remission be administered by customs officers.' 5 ' This pro-
cedure should also be applied to property forfeited pursuant to
internal revenue liquor laws. Consolidation of the administration
of remission procedures would lead to a more uniform application
of prescribed standards for remission.
2. Judicial Review. The final decision of the Attorney Gen-
eral regarding the remission of forfeitures should be made review-
able by a federal district court in all cases. Because unremitted
property is proceeded against by the government, judicial review of
the Attorney General's decision regarding the claimant's innocence
and entitlement to remission could be made at the time of the trial.
Presently, for remissions of property seized pursuant to inter-
nal revenue liquor laws, the trial judge is empowered to exercise
sound discretion to afford relief to innocent parties having an inter-
est in the condemned property. He may remit or mitigate the forfei-
ture as reason and justice allow.'52 This policy should be expanded
to include judicial review for remissions of all forfeitures. The deci-
sion of the district court should be reversed on appeal only in the
most extreme circumstances.
53
148. Id. at 1325.
149. Agencies typically authorized to handle forfeitures are law enforcement agencies
under the Treasury Department and the Department of Justice. They include, but are not
limited to, the Drug Enforcement Agency, Customs Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the Secret Service.
150. Tariff Act of 1930, § 618, 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976).
151. It might also be feasible to form an independent body to consider all initial peti-
tions since remission is merely an ancillary function of an agency's activities. This function
could, therefore, be easily separated from agency operations.
152. See United States v. One 1947 DeSoto Sedan, 87 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
153. See Beaudry v. United States, 105 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1939).
Vol. 8
21
Oberndorfer: Forfeiture Remission: A Comparative Study of British, Canadian, a
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1978
FORFEITURE REMISSION
3. Guidelines. Parties with an ownership interest in trans-
portation property, excluding possessory interest, should be advised
of precautionary measures to be taken to shield themselves from
forfeiture liability. In this regard, the guidelines set forth in the
United States internal revenue liquor law and the Canadian cus-
toms law should serve as an exemplary model.
154
Under United States law, the first prerequisite to remission is
that the claimant's ownership interest in the seized property be ac-
quired in good faith.' 5  The second requirement is that the claim-
ant have no knowledge or reason to know that his property would
be used for illegal purposes. 5 6 Canadian law phrases the latter re-
quirement in terms of the claimant's innocence of complicity in the
offense or collusion with the offender.'57 Although the burden of
proving lack of knowledge or reason to know may be greater than
the burden of showing innocence of complicity or collusion, the
former would appear to be a reasonable requirement.
The third prerequisite to remission is contingent upon the
existence of a contract or agreement between the claimant and vio-
lator. The statute places a burden of inquiry upon designated offi-
cials as to the purchaser's record or reputation. 15 8 United States
case law has not imposed this requirement of inquiry on businesses
which negotiate contracts or agreements for the rental of
automobiles. Canadian law, however, has imposed a requirement
of reasonable inquiry in such transactions. 
59
154. See notes 131 and 132 supra, and accompanying text.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 3617(b) (1976) and Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT c.C-40, § 168(2)
(1970).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 3617(b) (1976).
157. Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.C-40, § 168(5)(a) (1970).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3617(b) (1976). See note 118 supra, and accompanying text. See also
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), in which the Court held
that a floating standard might be employed to determine whether the claimant discharged his
duty:
[I]t would be difficult to reject the Constitutional claim of an owner whose property
subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or consent
.... Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he
was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done
all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property;
for in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served
legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive.
Id. at 689-90.
159. Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.C-40 § 168(5)(b) (1970), requires that the claimant
exercise "all reasonable care.., to satisfy himself that [the vehicle] was not likely to be used
contrary to this Act. ... See Tilden Drive Yourself Co. v. Deputy Minister of National
Revenue for Customs and Excise, [1955] Que. C.B.R. 379. For the United States position, see
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V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, it is feasible to formulate a system of remission which
would afford an innocent party claiming an interest in forfeited
transportation property the greatest opportunity to secure remis-
sion. It has been demonstrated that such a system would be not
only feasible, but workable, practical, and beneficial. Legislative in-
action to remedy the present inequities serves to perpetuate an
anomaly which deprives an innocent party of his property. On the
other hand, it may cause the judiciary to slowly defect to safer con-
stitutional ground and judicially legislate a remedy for the inno-
cent.
Ron H Oberndorfer
United States v. Rent-A-Car Service of Florida, Inc., 239 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1956); Harris v.
United States, 215 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1954).
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